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There is a great deal of concern among the chattering classes that the public
does not understand science, especially science that is essential for formulat-
ing appropriate public policy. Many members of the public fail to vaccinate
their children or fail to support moves to reduce climate-changing emissions.
But, it is said, the necessity of vaccination or of the amelioration of green-
house gas production has been established beyond doubt by our best science.
So how can people refuse to believe it? Often a good deal of the blame is put
on people who should know better, apparent experts who nonetheless insist
on arguing against these established facts and sometimes succeed in per-
suading large swathes of the public to share their benighted opinions.
This excellent book by Inmaculada de Melo-Martín and Kristen Intemann
shows how much is not only wrong but even dangerous about this common
picture. An interesting observation with which to begin is that as de Melo-
Martín and Intemann note, a key part of the preceding story is the so-called
deficit model of the public understanding of science, the view that policy goes
wrong because the public does not understand science and the solution is to
provide them with better information. Social scientists have taken the failure
of the deficit model as an established fact for 30 years or so, but arguably it is
still quite widely endorsed among philosophers. (Obviously, I do not assume
that providing philosophers with better information will immediately solve
the problem.)
Much of The Fight against Doubt is devoted to discussing how we should
think about the apparently expert promoters of false opinions. In rejecting the
deficit model, de Melo-Martín and Intemann do not aim to persuade us that
perhaps anthropogenic climate change is a myth or MMR vaccinations cause
autism, still less that the world was created 6,000 years ago. Indeed the pro-
motion of such views very probably constitutes what they call normatively
inappropriate dissent (NID) from established scientific orthodoxy. Their point
is rather that, contrary to what is often assumed in the deficit model, it is far
from easy to say what constitutes NID.
A criterion for dissent being normatively inappropriate is that it fails to ad-
vance, or impedes, scientific progress. An obvious problem, then, is that one
does not have to be a card-carrying Popperian to believe that the attempt to
criticize scientific consensus is often valuable. Certainly no one should want
to put a blanket prohibition on all rejection of scientific orthodoxy. Are there
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not features of the kinds of dissent that have been so pernicious that readily
distinguish them from the normal, critical process of advancement of sci-
ence? NID, one might imagine, is often provided in bad faith, or it violates
the norms of good scientific method, or it unjustly allocates the inductive
risks consequent on its falsity.
De Melo-Martín and Intemann provide careful and convincing argu-
ments against the sufficiency of each of these alternative explanations. Bad
faith is hard to detect, and it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition
for NID. Philosophers of science will need little persuasion that scientific
method is a tricky and controversial notion. And it is not always possible to
quantify the inductive risk of rejecting a hypothesis that enjoys the consensus
of the scientific community. All these criteria have their uses in analyzing sci-
entific debate, but none of them, according to de Melo-Martín and Intemann,
is up to the task of defining NID.
To take one illustrative example, suppose that seeking simpler theories is
a principle of correct scientific method. Is evolution or intelligent design a
simpler theory? Evolutionary theory may claim that it has a simpler ontol-
ogy, solely empirically observable matter, than intelligent design, which must
add a further unknown intelligent cause. But intelligent design supportersmay
reply that their theory posits only a single cause to explain the world’s ob-
served complexity, as opposed to the countless contingencies in the evolution-
ist’s narrative (50). If one doubts whether simplicity is really an epistemic vir-
tue, this only points to the difficulty of agreeing on the content of such a
criterion.
Where should we go from here? While, as I have noted, de Melo-Martín
and Intemann do not wish to deny that there is NID, and that it is a bad thing,
they generally downplay its importance in explaining the failures of policy.
Instead, they argue, a more potent explanation of why the public is some-
times skeptical about even the strongest scientific consensus is that their trust
in scientists is limited. Moreover, they also claim that excessive attention on
the scientific background of policy proposals, even sometimes the belief that
scientific findings straightforwardly entail the desirability of certain policies,
is a serious mistake.
The emphasis on trust is a very important positive thesis inTheFight against
Doubt. There are good reasons why the public is somewhat skeptical about
what scientists say. There arewell-publicized cases of scientific fraud; an ever-
increasing proportion of scientific research is sponsored by commercial en-
terprises, and there is strong evidence that science funded this way reaches
significantly different conclusions from publicly funded research. The com-
mercialization of research leads to concerns about scientists’ real goals and
reasonable suspicions of conflict of interest.
The second point should also, perhaps, be obvious but definitely bears re-
emphasis and elaboration. Differences in policy choice do not merely or even
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mainly reflect differences in scientific opinion but rather different values. To
take a fairly extreme case, catastrophic climate change in 100 years’ time is
only a problem if you think that we have some ethical responsibility for future
generations. It is possible to argue that future generations do not exist (now)
and only existent things matter. It is at any rate something philosophers de-
bate. So climate change deniers and activists might agree about the facts
of anthropogenic climate change but disagree about the policy implications
of these facts. More generally, different priorities attaching to individual au-
tonomy and the common good underlie disagreements on a wide range of
policy question, and the disagreements may be quite independent of agree-
ment or disagreement about the scientific facts. The idea that misinformation
about scientifically established truth is what is really at stake may easily dis-
tract attention. Indeed, it is quite widely agreed by philosophers of science
nowadays that values inescapably and appropriately shape scientific beliefs
themselves.
The book leaves me with one rather dark reservation. It is that the argu-
ment about trust seems—in a sense that is in no way critical—rather old-
fashioned. I am writing this 2 days after my country, the ( just barely) United
Kingdom, followed the Unites States in appointing (at least we did not elect
him) a notorious liar as our political leader. Boris Johnson built his career
making up amusing stories about European bureaucracy that were published
as fact in a leading British newspaper, and then he rose to the top of his po-
litical party by leading a campaign to leave the European Union based on a
range of indisputable falsehoods. It is not merely that Johnson makes up
whatever purported facts suit him at that particular moment. More disturb-
ing still is that everyone knows, and, while some commentators do see this
is as a regrettable characteristic for a prime minister, on the whole nobody
seems to care very much.
My very pessimistic worry is that epistemic trust is no longer a positive at-
titude that has much salience in the current social milieu. As one of Johnson’s
main rivals for the leadership of his party,Michael Gove, remarked during the
campaign to leave the European Union, “the people in this country have had
enough of experts” (interview by Faisal Islam, Sky News, June 3, 2016,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?vpGGgiGtJk7MA). What Johnson offers
in the place of truth, or expertise, is hope. The political failures of his prede-
cessor he attributes largely to an insufficiently optimistic personality. What
was impossible for Eeyore is no problem at all for Tigger. It is not just that
we do not believe the experts, more fundamentally it is just that we do not like
them very much. The decision to push the Facebook “like” button precedes
rather than follows our deciding to believe what they have to say. Hence,
we believe movie stars or just “influencers” rather than experts.
In summary, de Melo-Martín and Intemann have provided an invaluable
analysis of the failure of the public to accept the overwhelming consensus of
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experts and rightly warned us against attaching too much of the blame for
this to dissenting voices. They also do a great service in pointing out the dan-
gers, not merely intellectual, of overestimating the role of scientific findings
in the formation of policy. And they are surely right that the lack of trust in
scientists is a crucial part of the explanation of the problem. Although they
are right, too, that there are aspects of science that go some way to explain
this lack of trust, and they make a number of sensible suggestions about how
trust might be restored, I fear that the problem may be more deeply rooted in
the contemporary Zeitgeist than they allow. I hope I am wrong.
JOHN DUPRÉ, UNIVERSITY OF EXETER
Otavio Bueno and Steven French, Applying Mathematics: Immersion, In-
ference, Interpretation. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2018), 288 pp.,
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Recent decades have seen intense interest in models: What are they? How
do they work? Should they be understood realistically? And so on. More re-
cently philosophers of mathematics have come to focus on the nature of ap-
plied mathematics. Similar questions have arisen: How does mathematics
apply? Or, more to the point, how does mathematics model the world? Is
it, as Eugene Wigner suggested, a miracle? Can mathematics explain phys-
ical phenomena and, if so, does this mean mathematics must be true, as re-
alists sometimes argue? The topics of models and appliedmathematics come
together in this very fine volume.
For a long time Otavio Bueno and Steven French have been addressing
these issues. Sometimes they did so together, sometimes singly, sometimes
with other coauthors. They see themselves now as having converged on a
common outlook. Applying Mathematics is the outcome, a systematic ac-
count of their views on models and especially how mathematics figures in
all this. Among other things, Bueno and French offer an alternative to Mark
Steiner’s approach to the applicability of mathematics and a sensible response
to Wigner’s puzzle about the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics.
In this short review, we discuss a couple of topics, Bueno and French’s
particular conception of mathematical models and how they see mathemat-
ics as explanatory. But it should be noted that there are lots of other interest-
ing things in this book, such as the use of problematic mathematics (e.g.,
Dirac’s delta function), that we must pass over.
Making sense of applied mathematics is the principal aim of Bueno and
French. Like many contemporary philosophers of science, they hold that the
key to understanding science is to be found in models. Theories are hardly
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